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In Bayesian inference tasks, information about base rates as well as hit rate and false-
alarm rate needs to be integrated according to Bayes’ rule after the result of a diagnostic
test became known. Numerous studies have found that presenting information in a
Bayesian inference task in terms of natural frequencies leads to better performance
compared to variants with information presented in terms of probabilities or percentages.
Natural frequencies are the tallies in a natural sample in which hit rate and false-alarm
rate are not normalized with respect to base rates. The present research replicates the
beneficial effect of natural frequencies with four tasks from the domain of management,
and with management students as well as experienced executives as participants. The
percentage of Bayesian responses was almost twice as high when information was
presented in natural frequencies compared to a presentation in terms of percentages.
In contrast to most tasks previously studied, the majority of numerical responses were
lower than the Bayesian solutions. Having heard of Bayes’ rule prior to the study did
not affect Bayesian performance. An implication of our work is that textbooks explaining
Bayes’ rule should teach how to represent information in terms of natural frequencies
instead of how to plug probabilities or percentages into a formula.
Keywords: bayesian inference, updating beliefs, natural frequency, representation format, management,
executives, applied business statistics
Introduction
Twenty years ago, Gigerenzer and Hoffrage (1995) demonstrated that Bayesian inferences can be
improved without instructing participants how to solve such Bayesian tasks. By providing the
relevant information not in terms of probabilities, percentages, or relative frequencies, as it is usually
done, but in terms of natural frequencies, the percentage of correct (i.e., Bayesian) inferences tripled,
specifically, from 16 to 46%. What is a Bayesian inference task and what are natural frequencies?
Consider the following example:
The Skiwell Manufacturing Company gets material from two suppliers. Supplier A’s materials
make up for 30% of what is used, with supplier B providing the rest. Past records indicate that 15%
of supplier A’s materials are defective and 10% of B’s material are defective. Since it is impossible
to tell which supplier the material came from once they are in the inventory, the manager wants
to know: What is the probability that material comes from supplier A given that it has been
identified as defective?
If the question was “What is the probability that material, randomly drawn from the inventory, comes
from supplier A,” then the answer would be easy: 30%. Since 30 and 70% are the base rates for the
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two suppliers, A and B, respectively, one could simply use these
base rates when asked about the prior probability that material
comes from suppliers A or B. Taking supplier A as a reference,
these two probabilities will henceforth be referred to as p(H) and
p( H), which is the standard notation for the probability that a
hypothesized event will occur (or not), or whether a hypothesis is
true (or not).
The term “prior” refers to the point in time before diagnostic
information has been given. In the example above, such data
(D) has indeed been observed—specifically, the material has been
identified as defective. This information should be used to update
the prior probability. Following this update, the best estimate that
the material comes from supplier A is the posterior probability,
p(H|D). It can be calculated using Bayes’ rule:
p(HjD) = p(H)p(DjH)p(H)p(DjH) + p( H)p(Dj  H) (1)
where p(D|H) stands for the probability that material is defective
if it comes from supplier A (in the example above, this probability
is given by the relative frequency of 15%), and where p(D| H)
stands for the probability thatmaterial is defective if it comes from
supplier B (in the example above, 10%).
Previous research has shown that people have difficulties to
infer the posterior probability from the prior probability and
the two likelihoods, p(D|H) and p(D| H) (in terms of signal-
detection theory, these two likelihoods are referred to as hit
rate and false-alarm rate, respectively; in medical terms, the
hit rate is called sensitivity and the false-alarm rate is the
complement of the specificity). In order to give the reader a
better chance to experience some empathy with participants, we
do not reveal the Bayesian solution to the Skiwell Manufacturing
Company task at this point—but note that the task was even
harder for the participants because they, unlike the reader, did
not have Equation 1 at their disposal. Kahneman and Tversky
(1972) concluded from their research that participants do not
integrate the three pieces of information; they rather confuse the
posterior probability, p(H|D), with the likelihood of the observed
data if the prior hypothesis were true, p(D|H), and provide
the latter as an answer when asked for the former. Kahneman
and Tversky consider this confusion as an application of the
representativeness heuristic—which Gigerenzer (1996), in turn,
considers to be a re-description or a “one-word explanation”
(p. 594; see also Gigerenzer and Murray, 1987). Using the
representativeness heuristic amounts to ignoring the base rates,
which Kahneman and Tversky (1972) demonstrated with a
between-subjects design: The posterior beliefs of two groups of
participants were indistinguishable even though these two groups
received different base rates and should hence have different prior
probabilities. The authors concluded that “In his evaluation of
evidence man is apparently not a conservative Bayesian: he is
not Bayesian at all” (p. 450). This “base-rate neglect” is one of
the prime examples for a cognitive fallacy investigated in the
“heuristics and biases” program (Kahneman et al., 1982), and Bar-
Hillel (1980) stated that “the genuineness, the robustness, and the
generality of the base-rate fallacy are matters of established fact”
(p. 215).
This conclusion has been challenged by Gigerenzer and
Hoffrage (1995) with a study in which they represented the
information about base rate and the two likelihoods in terms of
natural frequencies. Using this representation format, our task
reads as follows:
The Skiwell Manufacturing Company gets material from two
suppliers. Out of 1,000 items, supplier A delivers 300 and
supplier B delivers the remaining ones. Past records indicate
that 45 of the 300 items delivered by supplier A are defective
and that 70 out of the 700 items delivered by B are defective.
Since it is impossible to tell which supplier the material came
from once they are in the inventory, the manager wants to
know: How many of the items that have been identified as
defective come from supplier A?
Natural frequencies are the frequencies that naturally result if
a sample is taken from a population (or if the entire population
is considered). In case of one hypothesis (H, with its complement
 H) and one dichotomous, diagnostic variable that represents the
data (D), natural frequencies are the four entries in the bivariate
2 2 table. The frequencies of the four conjunctive events can be
displayed in two trees, in each of which the total sample size (or
population) is the top node, and the four possible combinations
are on the lowest level. One of these two possible trees displays
the row margins at the intermediate level, and the other one
the column margins. For instance, in Figure 1, Panel B, the two
natural frequencies for a sample of 1,000 items are displayed at
the intermediate level: 300 come from supplier A and 700 from
supplier B, corresponding to the two base rates of 30 and 70%.
From this tree in Panel B, it is relatively easy to determine the total
number of defective items (45 + 70= 115), and the total number
of intact items (255+ 630= 885). These two numbers are basically
the margins of the diagnostic variable, and the first is included in
the Bayesian solution to our task: Of the 115 defective items, 45
were delivered by supplier A. This is also the Bayesian response
thatwewithheld abovewhenwe presented the problem in terms of
percentages: p(H|D)= 0.39 (or, as a ratio, 45/115). From Figure 1,
Panel B, it is also easy to construct the tree displayed in Panel
C, which would also allow one to answer to other questions,
for instance, how many of the intact items were delivered by
supplier B.
The tree in Panel A displays the information as it has been
represented in the initial version of the Skiwell Manufacturing
Company task.What made it hard to derive the solution from this
representation, compared to a natural frequency representation,
was the fact that the two likelihoods have been normalized with
respect to the base rates, and for exactly this reason, Gigerenzer
and Hoffrage (1995) predicted that representations in terms of
probabilities, percentages, and relative frequencies will not differ
with respect to Bayesian performance (Prediction 4, p. 692). For a
more detailed discussion of the notion of natural frequencies and
its relationship to other representation formats, see Hoffrage et al.
(2002), Gigerenzer and Hoffrage (2007), and Johnson and Tubau
(in review).
Natural Frequencies have proven to facilitate diagnostic
inferences in laypeople (Gigerenzer and Hoffrage, 1995),
advanced medical students and advanced law students (Hoffrage
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FIGURE 1 | Numerical information of the Skiwell Manufacturing Company
task. (A) Information provided in percentages. Hit rate and false-alarm rate have
been normalized with respect to the base rates of the two suppliers. (B) Natural
frequencies with suppliers at the intermediate level. The frequencies of the four
conjunctive events implicitly contain the base rate information about the suppliers.
(C) Natural frequencies with diagnostic information at the intermediate level. From
the perspective of (B), the tree in (C) represents a Bayesian update, in which the
four distinct events are now conditioned on diagnostic information.
et al., 2000), patients (Garcia-Retamero and Hoffrage, 2013), and
physicians (Hoffrage and Gigerenzer, 1998). This result is well
established (Mandel, 2015), it has been replicated by many others
(e.g., Akl et al., 2011; Woloshin and Schwartz, 2011), and this
work has received wide attention in the medical field and beyond
(Gigerenzer, 2002, 2014; Gigerenzer et al., 2007; Gigerenzer
and Gray, 2011). For a discussion about when and why natural
frequencies are effective, see Brase (2008), Brase and Hill (2015),
Gigerenzer and Hoffrage (2007), Hill and Brase (2012), and
Johnson and Tubau (in review).
Bayesian inference problems are also vital to management
decisions. For instance, a sales manager may be interested
in whether a customer places more weight on quality than
price if her yearly income is above average, a bank may be
interested in whether it will see the annuity for a mortgage
if the customer will lose his job, a project manager may
be interested in whether the group will be able to complete
the project in time if one of the key engineers will get sick
unexpectedly, and so on. The fact that the task of updating
beliefs is ubiquitous and also relevant in the world of business
makes it even more surprising that, to the best of our knowledge,
there is no research investigating whether natural frequencies are
also beneficial for managers and management problems. This
is exactly the aim of the present paper. The participants in the
studies reported below were executives and business students
who had to work on four different tasks with business-related
content.
Materials and Methods
Participants
Participants were undergraduates at a business faculty (n = 259)
and executives (n= 181; for a total n of 440). The undergraduates
were either students enrolled in their third year of the Bachelor
of Science in Management program of a public Swiss university
who took the lecture “Judgment and DecisionMaking” of the first
author, or students enrolled in their first year of the Master of
Science in Management program who took the seminar “Analytic
and Intuitive Judgment” of the second author. Over 3 years,
three cohorts of bachelor students and in the fourth year, one
cohort of bachelor students and one cohort of master students
were tested, with 74, 45, 49, 62, and 29 students responding to
the questionnaire. Demographic information was only collected
for the last two cohorts: The bachelor students were on average
21.4 years old (SD = 1.2) and 51% were female, and the master
students were on average 24 years old (SD = 1.9) and 30% were
female. The entire population of the three earlier cohorts of
bachelor students was demographically similar to the bachelor
students of the last cohort.
The executives were also tested in a classroom setting, namely
in their role as students in an executive MBA program. In
fact, they enrolled in either of two different programs. One
was the Executive MBA program offered by a public Swiss
university in which they took a course “Managerial Decision
Making and Negotiation” of the first author. Four different
cohorts from four different years have been tested, with 27, 28,
22, and 43 respondents (n = 120). Average age was 38, 38,
37, and 38 years, and 87, 83, 72, and 76% were male. These
participants are henceforth referred to as junior managers. The
other program (Program for ExecutiveDevelopment, in fact a very
prestigious and competitive program) was offered by a private
Swiss business school. The executives took a course taught by the
third author who had invited the first author as a guest lecturer.
Two cohorts of the same module have been tested, with 27 and 34
participants each (n = 61). With an average age of 42 years, these
executives were older than the ones from the public university,
and so they are henceforth referred to as senior managers. In
fact, many of them were directors or vice-presidents in their
companies.
Materials, Design, and Procedure
Four tasks have been used, all adapted from Groebner et al.
(2007). The Skiwell Manufacturing task introduced above was
one of them, the three others involved error/fraud detection
(IRS Audit), success in the context of an auction (Techtronics
Equipment), and quality control (Varden Soap). For each task,
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TABLE 1 | The four tasks used in the present study with the information provided and the Bayesian solution.
Task Condition Base rate Hit rate False-alarm rate Bayesian solution
Skiwell manufacturing Percentages 30 15 10 39.13
Natural frequencies 300 of 1000 45 of 300 70 of 700 45 of 115
IRS Audit Percentages 20 30 10 42.86
Natural frequencies 200 of 1000 60 of 200 80 of 800 60 of 140
Techtronics equipment Percentages 60 70 50 67.74
Natural frequencies 60 of 100 42 of 60 20 of 40 42 of 62
Varden soap Percentages 60 5 10 42.86
Natural frequencies 600 of 1000 30 of 600 40 of 400 30 of 70
two versions were constructed, one in which the information was
presented in percentages and one in which natural frequencies
were used (see the Appendix for the exact formulations of these
other three tasks, and Table 1 for the numbers involved in all four
tasks).
Each questionnaire consisted of two different tasks, either two
percentage versions, or two natural frequency versions. Which
task was paired with which other task and their order within the
same questionnaires was counterbalanced, so that the number
of respondents per task and per version was, ideally, equally
distributed (minor deviations from an equal distribution were
due to the fact that the number of students in a classroom was
rarely divisible by the minimal number of questionnaires that
would allow for an equal distribution, resulting in 111, 110, 111,
110 for the percentage versions, and 110, 108, 111, 109 for the
frequency versions of Skiwell, IRS, Techtronics, and Varden Soap,
respectively).
Students were given 7 min to work on the tasks. They were
allowed to take notes. Some students had a pocket calculator with
them (or a smartphone with this function), and very few asked
whether they could use them. The answer was positive, but with
respect to those who did not have one at their disposal, it was
added that writing down a mathematical operation, for instance,
a ratio, would be sufficient. In other words, we made it clear that
we were not interested in whether they could enter numbers into
a pocket calculator, but whether they were able to figure outwhich
numbers to enter, and that writing down the correct operation
would be treated as a correct response even if they would not
convert it into an exact decimal. After 7 min the questionnaires
were collected, but it could not have been prevented that
some students continued writing during the collection
procedure.
This procedure was slightly altered for the 62 bachelor students
and the 29 master students who were tested during the last
year of data collection. After 7 min, they were prompted to
turn the questionnaire to a new page that was not included
in the questionnaire of the 181 executives and the other 168
undergraduates. On this page, they entered their demographics
and responded to several questions concerning their prior
knowledge about Bayes’ rule. To prevent participants from being
exposed to the term “Bayes’ rule” within the questionnaire
before finishing the inference problems, these questions were only
displayed via a projector once all students had finishedworking on
the inference problems.
After having turned in their questionnaires, students
received a lecture about Bayesian inferences and representation
formats—sometimes right after the questionnaires, sometimes in
another lecture. When those participants whose booklet did not
include the page with the questions regarding Bayes’ rule were
asked, during this debrief, whether they were familiar with this
kind of task and whether they had received some instructions
or training beforehand, for instance, in a lecture on statistics,
very few (about 5% of the executives and about 10% of the
management undergraduates) raised their hand.
Analysis
The analysis was mainly based on outcomes, that is, on
participants’ numerical responses. Following Gigerenzer and
Hoffrage (1995), a response has been classified as Bayesian if
the absolute difference between this response and the Bayesian
solution was lower than one percentage point. This criterion
was lenient enough to also include rounding up or down to the
next whole number. In fact, many participants in the percentage
condition were able to derive the Bayesian solution, wrote down
the formula, used the pocket calculator of their smartphone
to compute the exact value, but then wrote, for the Skiwell
Manufacturing task, 39 or 40% (instead of 39.1304%).
Traces of cognitive processes, that is, notes and remarks that
revealed how participants arrived at their answers, were also
considered. If a participant provided a numerical response that
we would have classified as Bayesian, but if the notes made it
clear that this match was only coincidental and resulted from a
non-Bayesian rationale, then we did not classify the response as
Bayesian. Conversely, if a participant in the percentage condition
wrote down a ratio that corresponded to the Bayesian solution,
but did not compute the exact number (by hand or with a
pocket calculator), we nevertheless classified it as a Bayesian
answer—and as we already mentioned above, participants were
informed about this.
Results
Do Natural Frequencies Facilitate Bayesian
Inferences in Our Four Tasks?
Yes. Figure 2 displays the percentages of Bayesian responses,
both for the four tasks separately and across all tasks. In the
percentage condition, 87 of 442 responses (19.7%) were Bayesian,
and in the natural frequency condition, these were 170 of 438
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FIGURE 2 | Percentages of Bayesian responses, depending on
whether the numerical information has been communicated in terms
of percentages or natural frequencies.
(38.8%). A logistic regression confirmed that the format in which
information was presented had a significant effect (B = 1.04,
SE= 0.20, z= 5.24, p< 0.001; after controlling for task, order, and
participant sample, and with standard errors clustered for each
participant).
Does Representation Format also Affect the
Non-Bayesian Inferences?
While the previous analysis focused on the percentages of
Bayesian responses, it is also useful to take a look at the full
distribution of numerical estimates, independent of whether
participants succeeded in deriving the Bayesian solution or
not. Figure 3 provides such a more fine-grained picture of
the distribution of numerical estimates for the four tasks.
Two estimates in the natural frequency condition for which
the numerator was larger than the denominator, and one
of 125% in the percentage condition were classified as non-
Bayesian in Figure 2, but were not graphically displayed in
Figure 3.
Overall, most estimates were too low: Across all tasks in the
percentage condition, 58.4% of the responses were lower than the
Bayesian solution, 19.7% were classified as Bayesian, 21.7% were
higher than the Bayesian solution and 0.2% were above 100%.
For the natural frequency condition, these numbers were 43.4,
38.8, 17.4, and 0.4% respectively. When information has been
presented in terms of natural frequencies, the responses were
not only more often correct (see Figure 2), but also closer to
the Bayesian solution: The average absolute difference between
responses and Bayesian solution was 19.2 in the percentage
condition, and 15.1 for natural frequencies (excluding responses
above 100%). Regression analysis revealed that this difference
was significant (B = 3.84, SE = 1.35, t = 2.84, p = 0.005; after
controlling for task, order, and participant sample, and with
standard errors clustered for each participant). Closer inspection,
however, revealed that this difference was mainly due to the
Bayesian responses. After these have been excluded, the picture
even reversed: In the percentage condition, the average absolute
difference of the remaining cases was 24.5, and in the natural
frequency condition, it was 26.3 (but this effect was not significant:
B = 2.12, SE = 1.27, t = 1.68, p = 0.095). In sum, in each of
the two experimental conditions, most responses were too low.
Participants’ responses were closer to the Bayesian solution in
the natural frequency condition, but this effect was mainly due
to the fact that there were more Bayesian responses in the first
place.
Figure 3 also shows that most numerical estimates were either
identical to one of the pieces of information that has been given
for a particular task, namely the base rate (Br), the hit rate (Hr),
or the false-alarm rate (F), or that they matched the Bayesian
response (Bay) or the probability that D and H occur together
(joint occurrence, J, which is the product of hit rate times base rate
of focal hypothesis). Results from a more detailed analysis of the
most frequently used cognitive strategies—indicated by the lines
in Figure 3—will be reported in the next section that focusses on
the effects of participant sample (Table 2).
Who Performed Better: The Undergraduates
or the Executives?
Figure 4 displays the percentages of Bayesian responses for
the different types of participants. No clear picture emerged.
While the undergraduates performed worse than the executives
in the percentage condition (14.6, 28.6, 22.6, and 26.6%, for
undergraduates, junior executives, senior executives, and
executives combined, respectively), they outperformed the
executives when the information was represented in natural
frequencies (40.5, 39.5, 30.0, and 36.2%, respectively).
The main effect of participant sample was not significant
(B = 0.219, SE = 0.26, z = 0.86, p = 0.392), but the interaction
between participant sample and representation format was
(B = 0.99, SE = 0.40, z = 2.52, p = 0.012; after controlling for
representation format, task, and order, and with standard errors
clustered for each participant). Analyzing the contrast between
undergraduates and executives (junior and senior combined)
separately, revealed a significant difference in the percentage
condition (14.6 vs. 26.6%, B = 0.796, SE = 0.310, z = 2.57,
p= 0.010), while the difference in the natural frequency condition
was negligible and not significant (40.5 vs. 36.2%, B = 0.213,
SE = 0.252, z = 1.12, p = 0.398). Finally, analyzing the contrast
between the two representation formats revealed a significant
difference between the percentage condition and the natural
frequency condition within the undergraduate sample (14.6 vs.
40.5%, B = 1.48, SE = 0.28, z = 5.32, p < 0.001), while
the superiority of natural frequencies did not reach statistical
significance within the sample of executives (junior and senior
combined; 26.6 vs. 36.2%, B = 0.47, SE = 0.28, z = 1.67,
p= 0.095).
Table 2 completes the picture by also including the non-
Bayesian strategies. While Figure 3 splits the frequencies of the
five different cognitive strategies according to representation
format and task, Table 2 splits them according to representation
format and participant sample (again, undergraduates vs.
executives; the latter with junior and senior combined). This table
also displays, for each strategy separately, the coefficients (B) and
the p-values of the five different logistic regressions, each with the
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FIGURE 3 | Distribution of numerical estimates for the four tasks. The
three straight lines indicate information that has been given in the task: Br
indicates the base rate for the focal category, Hr indicates the hit rate (that is,
diagnostic information conditioned on the focal category, p(D|H)), F indicates
the false-alarm rate (that is, diagnostic information conditioned on the
non-focal category, p(D| H)). The two dotted lines indicate possible ways of
combining this information: Bay indicates the Bayesian solution, p(H|D), and J
stands for Joint Occurrence of D and H, p(D and H). The numbers on these
lines (and those on the y-axes) denote the frequencies of the corresponding
numerical estimates. For instance, 10 participants in the percentage condition
of the IRS task provided a numerical estimate between 20 and 20.99% (in
fact, all these 10 participants wrote exactly 20%, which was identical to the
base rate of that task), and 12 participants provided an estimate that has been
coded as a Bayesian response (three gave the exact Bayesian response,
either as the ratio 45/115, or they wrote down the exact number including the
decimal, 42.86%, most likely with the help of a pocket calculator, one
responded with 42.8%, and one with 42.9%. These five responses are
displayed in the bracket ranging from 42.0–42.99%. The remaining seven
participants responded with 43%. These seven estimates are displayed in the
adjacent bracket, namely 43.0–43.99%, but they were nevertheless coded as
Bayesian because our classification criterion allowed for rounding within one
percentage point, see above). Note that something similar could be observed
for each of the four tasks: the responses that have been classified as Bayesian
are spread across two adjacent brackets, and hence the number of Bayesian
responses is not visualized by one single bar, but rather consists of two lower
numbers visualized by two bars.
main effect of representation format and participant sample, and
the interaction between representation format and sample (after
controlling for task and order, and with standard errors clustered
for each participant). For each of the five cognitive strategies,
except for providing the false-alarm rate as response, the number
of participants who provided the corresponding numerical
estimate significantly differed between the percentage condition
and the natural frequency condition. In contrast, for none of the
strategies, except for joint occurrence, we observed a significant
effect of participant sample, and for none of the strategies, except
for Bayesian, the interaction between representation format and
participant sample reached significance.
Did the Order Matter?
No. Across all tasks, participants, and both representation
formats, a response has been classified as Bayesian in 30.5%
for tasks on the first page of the questionnaire and 28.0%
for tasks on the second page (in a logistic regression, the
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difference was not significant; B = 0.131, SE = 0.115, z = 1.14,
p = 0.254; after controlling for representation format, participant
sample and task, and with standard errors clustered for each
participant).
Did Prior Knowledge of Bayes’ Rule Make
a Difference?
For none of our executive participants, but for 91 of our 259
undergraduate participants (62 bachelor and 29 master students)
the booklet contained questions on demographics and on prior
knowledge about Bayes’ rule. A majority of 46 (74%) of the
bachelor students and 17 (59%) of the master students responded
that they have heard of Bayes’ rule before this lecture (overall,
63 of 91 = 69%). With the exception of one bachelor student,
all of those who had heard about Bayes’ rule said it was taught
to them in a course: 35 (56%) at school and 27 (44%) at
the university (62/91 = 68%). A minority of 27 (44 %) of
FIGURE 4 | Percentages of Bayesian responses, separately for the
different groups of participants.
the bachelor students and 13 (45%) of the master students
responded that they know when Bayes’ rule is applicable, and
7 (11%) of the bachelor students and 11 (38%) of the master
students (18/91 = 20%) were able to provide a short and
correct explanation (we applied a very lenient criterion and
coded answers such as “when conditional probabilities need to
be computed” as correct). When asked whether they are able
to formulate Bayes’ rule, 21 (34%) of the bachelor students
and 8 (28%) of the master students (29/91 = 32%) responded
with yes, but only 10 (16%) of the bachelor students and 1
(3%) of the master students (11/91 = 12%) wrote down the
correct formula. We should add that none of these 11 students
reproduced our Equation 1 exactly, instead they all used an
abridged version and wrote p(H|D) = p(H)p(D|H)/p(D)—which
we coded as correct, despite of the fact that we cannot
exclude the possibility that someone used a smartphone with
internet access, and despite having doubts that someone who
wrote down this abridged version was able to use it for our
Bayesian tasks and to understand that the denominator, p(D),
amounts to p(H)p(D|H) + p( H)p(D| H). These doubts lead
straightforward to our next question: How have these differences
between students been reflected in their ability to produce
Bayesian responses?
To the extent that teaching and instructions leave traces, one
may expect that those who had heard of Bayes’ rule performed
better than those who had not. To test this hypothesis, we
included the responses to each of the four questions about prior
knowledge of Bayes’ rule as a predictor of performance in a
separate logistic regression, controlling for format, task, order, and
participant sample, and with standard errors clustered for each
participant. None of these regressions revealed a significant effect
of prior knowledge on performance in our Bayesian tasks. To
investigate whether prior knowledge affects the ability to produce
Bayesian responses differentially, dependent on the format of
the question, we reran the logistic regressions, this time with an
additional interaction term between participants’ responses and
representation format. The result was the same: for none of the
four questions concerning prior knowledge of Bayes’ rule was
there a significant main effect or a significant interaction effect
on Bayesian performance.
TABLE 2 | Use of cognitive strategies, split by representation format and participant sample.
Logistic regression results
Percentages Natural frequencies Format Sample Format Sample
Cognitive strategy Undergraduates Executives Undergraduates Executives Total B p B p B p
Bayesian 14:57 26:6 40:53 36:21 29:2 1.47 <0.001 0.22 0.39 1.0 0.012
Base rate 11:42 11:17 1:52 2:3 6:6  2.21 0.001 0.47 0.55  0.47 0.587
Hit rate 4:72 5:85 13:26 14:94 9:5 1.15 0.001 0.12 0.69 0.05 0.886
False-alarm rate 1:97 3:19 4:17 3:45 3:2 0.78 0.174 0.18 0.76 0.7 0.413
Joint occurence 12:6 15:43 4:55 11:49 10:6  1.11 0.009 1.0 0.02  0.77 0.158
Total observations 254 188 264 174 880
The coefficients (B) and p-values result from five different logistic regressions, one for each strategy, that were conducted to determine how representation format and participant sample
affected strategy use (after controlling for task and order, and with standard errors clustered for each participant).
Total observations refer to the total number of responses on which the percentages reported in the cells are based, that is, the numbers in the cells denote column percentages.
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General Discussion
To the best of our knowledge, the present study is the first to
test whether natural frequencies facilitate Bayesian reasoning with
management related tasks given to management undergraduates
and executives. Even though the effect was not as strong as in
previous studies, it is still larger than most effects observed in the
social sciences: About twice as many participants came up with
the Bayesian response when information was presented in terms
of natural frequencies compared to percentages.
Distribution of Bayesian and Non-Bayesian
Responses: Toward an Ecological Analysis
of Bayesian Inference Tasks
A remarkable finding of our study is that most non-Bayesian
estimates were lower than the Bayesian solution (Figure 3). This
pattern is unusual, at least when compared to information in
typical medical diagnostic tasks in which the Bayesian response is
usually low and participants’ responses are usually much higher
(e.g., Eddy, 1982). How could one account for the different
response patterns? One obvious dimension along which the tasks
vary is numbers used for each particular problem. For most
diseases, the base rate is relatively low, and for most diagnostic
tests in medicine, the hit rate (or sensitivity) is relatively high, and
the false-alarm rate is relatively low. This was different in our four
tasks (see Table 1), for which the base rates were—compared to
mostmedical tasks—higher, the hit rates were lower, and the false-
alarm rates were higher. Hence, it seems to be straightforward to
explore the extent to which the base rate, the hit rate, and the false-
alarm rate affect strategy use. When we started to do exactly this,
it soon became evident that a larger database would be extremely
useful, and so we also included the responses to the fifteen tasks
of Gigerenzer and Hoffrage (1995) in the analysis. Moreover,
we complemented the set of the three quantitative task variables
with three qualitative dimensions—norm deviation, stakes, and
main focus—and subsequently used these task characteristics
to account for the variance of participants’ responses and
strategy use. This investigation, which can be considered as
an example of an ecological analysis of Bayesian inferences,
goes way beyond the scope of the present paper, and hence
we report the results elsewhere (Hafenbrädl and Hoffrage,
in review).
Differences between Undergraduates
and Executives
We do not know why undergraduates outperformed the
executives when information was presented in terms of
natural frequencies, whereas executives outperformed the
undergraduates when information was presented in terms of
percentages. Formulating this finding as an interaction, though,
may help to find a possible explanation. While representation
format played a larger role for undergraduates, executives were
relatively immune against this manipulation (Figure 4). In fact,
within the sample of executives the effect of representation
format (differences of 9.6 percentage points in favor of natural
frequencies) did not reach significance (p = 0.095, which may,
of course and as always for non-significant differences, be an
issue of statistical power). There might be two ways to arrive at a
response: arithmetic calculation and intuitive estimation. Maybe
executives had a more intuitive approach, possibly based on their
experience with similar problems in the world of business (Klein,
2002). If such experience is used, then representation format
might indeed play less of a role. In contrast, undergraduates
lack such experience and are hence more likely to approach the
tasks with logic, reasoning, and arithmetic. The fact that natural
frequencies facilitate the computation (Gigerenzer and Hoffrage,
1995) may hence account for the fact that undergraduates
benefitted quite a lot from this representation—more than the
executives did. But we must admit that this consideration is
highly speculative and we should add that we did not find a
similar pattern when comparing medical students (Hoffrage
et al., 2000) to experienced physicians (Hoffrage and Gigerenzer,
1998).
Order Effects: Time Pressure and Training
More participants came up with the Bayesian response for tasks
on the first page compared to tasks on the second page (difference
of 2.5 percentage points). There are two main explanations
for order effects: time pressure and training. If time pressure
played a role, then we should expect that performance declines.
In fact, out of those participants who provided an estimate to
only one task, there were 28 who did so for the task on the
first page, and 12 who did so only for the task on the second
page (corresponding to a difference of 4.8 percentage points).
In contrast, if training effects played a role, then we should
expect that performance will increase. To the extent that the
observed effect (2.5% better performance on first page) can be
conceived as a result of a simple linear combination of the two
possible components, time pressure and training, the effect of
training is probably larger than the 2.5% that we observed, simply
because this difference of 2.5% might have been overshadowed
by the effect of time pressure. But we hasten to add that the
observed difference was miniscule and of minor importance
from a theoretical and practical point of view, and that our data
does not allow us to assess the two possible contributing effects
independently.
Teaching Bayesian Inferences
Another remarkable finding of the present study is that 69% of
the undergraduates whom we asked said that they had heard of
Bayes’ rule, 68% said that they had been taught about it, 40%
said they knew when it is applicable, 20% were actually able to
correctly specify this, 32% said they were able to formulate Bayes’
rule, and only 12% could actually do so (and even this number
must probably be corrected downwards, see result section). These
numbers suggest that one should not be too optimistic that
teaching Bayes’ rule leads to sustainable knowledge, retrievable
from long-term memory. As one of the physicians studied in
Hoffrage and Gigerenzer (1998) remarked to the experimenter
after having filled out the questionnaire: “We have learned a
formula at university, but I have forgotten it.” Moreover, none
of the variables concerning prior knowledge of Bayes’ rule had a
significant effect on Bayesian performance in our task. This lack
of relationship could well be due to lack of statistical power, but if
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org June 2015 | Volume 6 | Article 6428
Hoffrage et al. Facilitating diagnostic inferences of managers
91 participants are not enough to establish any relationship then
such an effect, if existing at all, may be too small to be of practical
importance.
Why is it that prior exposure to Bayes’ rule seems to make
almost no difference? We suspect that difficulties to remember
Bayes’ rule and to benefit from instructions may be related to how
it is taught. In fact, inspecting an informal sample of textbooks
on business statistics (Lawrence and Pasternack, 2002; Anderson
et al., 2010; Newbold et al., 2010; Taylor, 2010) revealed the
same picture as for the medical field: Bayes’ rule is taught almost
exclusively using probabilities. We agree that such textbooks
must ensure that a student will, at the end of the lessons, be
able to handle probability information, but we disagree that the
best way to get there is to teach how to insert probabilities
into Bayes’ rule. Instead, we propose that students should be
taught how to convert probabilities into natural frequencies.
Sedlmeier and Gigerenzer (2001) have shown that a computerized
implementation of such training is by farmore effective compared
to traditional rule training: the proportion of accurate answers
doubled when participants had learned to represent probabilities
as natural frequencies, as opposed to inserting them into Bayes’
rule. Kurzenhäuser and Hoffrage (2002) obtained similar results
in a classroom setting with medical students and diagnostic tasks
from human genetics. Note that in both studies, the success of
the two treatments—in one, students had been taught how to
plug in probabilities into Bayes’ rule, and in the other, they
had been taught how to convert probability information into
natural frequencies and derive the solution from there—has been
evaluated by giving participants tasks with information presented
in terms of probabilities. Taken together, the findings presented
in this paper—supported by Sedlmeier and Gigerenzer’s (2001)
and Kurzenhäuser and Hoffrage’s (2002) evaluation of tutorial
programs—suggest that textbooks should no longer teach how to
plug probabilities or percentages into a formula but rather instruct
how to represent information in terms of natural frequencies
to achieve a more sustainable mastery of Bayesian inference
tasks.
Updating beliefs is a vital task, also in the domain of
management. Representing information in terms of natural
frequencies reduces computational complexity, improves
understanding and boosts Bayesian performance. The posterior
probability that managers can also benefit from natural
frequencies, given the data of the present study, has definitely
increased compared to the prior.
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Appendix
Sentences or fragments of sentences that appear in parentheses
and start with “P:” were only used in the percentage version, and
those starting with “F:” were only used in the natural frequency
version.
IRS Audit
This year experts project that (P: 20% of all) (F: 200 out of
1000) taxpayers will file an incorrect tax return. To identify
such incorrect returns, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has
been implemented. Unfortunately, this service is not perfect. IRS
auditors detect an error for (P: 30% of the) (F: only 60 of those
200) tax returns that are incorrect, and it will indicate an error in
(P: 10% of the) (F: 80 of these 800) tax returns that are correct.
The IRS has just notified a taxpayer there is an error in his
return.
(P: What is the probability that the return actually has an error?
_____ %)
(F: Howmany of the tax payers who have been notified by the IRS
that there is an error in their return, do actually have an error?
_____ of _____)
Techtronics Equipment Corporation
The Techtronics Equipment Corporation has developed a new
electronic device that it would like to sell to the US Military for
use in fighter aircraft. The sales manager knows that the military
has placed an order (P: in 60% of) (F: in 60 of 100) similar cases.
After making an initial sales presentation, military officials will
often ask for a second presentation to other military decision
makers. Historically, (P: 70% of successful companies are asked
to make a second presentation, whereas only 50% of unsuccessful
companies are asked back a second time.) (F: in 42 of the 60
successful cases, the companies were asked to make a second
presentation, whereas for the unsuccessful cases, the companies
were asked back a second time in only 20 of the 40 cases.)
Suppose Techtronics Equipment has just been asked to make a
second presentation and so the sales manager wonders:
(P: What is the probability that the company will make the sale?
_____ %)
(F: In how many of the cases in which a company has been called
back, did this company receive an order? _____ of _____)
Varden Soap Company
The Varden Soap Company has two production facilities, one in
Ohio and one in Virginia. The company makes the same type
of soap at both facilities. (P: The Ohio plant makes 60% of the
company’s total soap output, and the Virginia plant 40%.) (F:
Imagine 1000 containers of soap. The Ohio plant produces 600
of these containers, and the Virginia plant produces 400.) All
soap from the two facilities is sent to a central warehouse, where
it is intermingled. After extensive study, the quality assurance
manager has determined that (P: 5% of the soap produced in
Ohio and 10% of the soap in Virginia is) (F: 30 of the 600 soap
containers produced in Ohio and 40 of the 400 soap containers
produced inVirginia are) unusable due to quality problems.When
the company sells a defective product, it incurs not only the cost of
replacing the item but also the loss of goodwill. The vice president
for production would like to allocate these costs fairly between the
two plants.
(P: To do so, hewants to know, for instance:What is the probability
that a soap was produced in Ohio given that it is defective?
_____ %)
(F: To do so, he wonders, for instance: Howmany of the container
with defective soap where produced inOhio? _____ of _____)
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org June 2015 | Volume 6 | Article 64211
